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Abstract—In this article, an agent-based negotiation model
for negotiation teams that negotiate a deal with an opponent
is presented. Agent-based negotiation teams are groups of agents
that join together as a single negotiation party because they
share an interest that is related to the negotiation process. The
model relies on a trusted mediator that coordinates and helps
team members in the decisions that they have to take during
the negotiation process: which offer is sent to the opponent,
and whether or not the offers received from the opponent are
accepted. The main strength of the proposed negotiation model
is the fact that it guarantees unanimity within team decisions
since decisions report a utility to team members that is greater
than or equal to their aspiration levels at each negotiation round.
This work analyzes how unanimous decisions are taken within
the team and the robustness of the model against different types
of manipulations. An empirical evaluation is also performed to
study the impact of the different parameters of the model.
Index Terms—Negotiation teams, automated negotiation,
agreement technologies, multiagent systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
A negotiation team is a group of two or more interdepen-dent individuals who join together as a single negotiation
party because of their similar interests and objectives related
to the negotiation and who are all present at the bargaining
table [1]. Therefore, this group of individuals unites because
their members share goals that are related to a negotiation
with an opponent. For instance, negotiation teams formed by
different stakeholders are usually sent to the negotiation table
when a company decides to sell a product line to another
company. Nevertheless, as it has been stated in social sciences,
negotiation teams are not necessarily unitary players since
team members may have different preferences regarding the
possible outcomes of the negotiation process [2]. Thus, given
the divergence in preferences between teammates, the team
has to agree upon, not only a negotiation strategy to carry
out with the opponent, but also upon those agreements that
are acceptable to the team. Despite being studied in social
sciences to some extent [1], [2], as far as we know, negotiation
teams have been overlooked by artificial intelligence research.
We argue that a negotiation team is also an element that
may be appropriate for some scenarios involving software
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agents. For instance, let us imagine an example based on
an electronic market for travel and tourism. In this system,
a group of friends (each friend is represented by a software
agent) has decided to go on a trip together. This goal requires
a negotiation with a travel agency agent. The fact that the
group of agents (group of friends) has a common and shared
goal (which is going on a trip together), is clear, and it
requires an agreement with an opponent (the travel agency
agent). However, it also seems reasonable to assume that
friends may have different preferences regarding the negotiable
trip conditions: hotel quality, price, number of days to stay,
etc. For example, while some friends may care more about
comfort, others may be more interested in money. In this
type of scenario, and specially in open multi-agent systems,
mediated preference aggregation is complicated since i) agents
may be inclined to exaggerate their preferences in order to
ensure a certain level of utility; ii) preferences are delicate
information which may not be revealed to anyone; iii) utility
functions may be different and require an extensive and costly
aggregation. Hence, mechanisms that allow an agent-based
negotiation team to handle intra-team conflict (divergences in
preferences) while trying to get a deal from travel agencies’
agents are needed. Thus, it is necessary to provide agent-based
models for negotiation teams.
This article describes a mediated negotiation model for
agent-based negotiation teams that negotiate with an opponent.
The negotiation model defines the communications protocol
with the opponent, what decisions are taken by the negotiation
team, and how and when these decisions are taken (i.e.,
team dynamics) [3]. More specifically, our preliminary study
presented about this model (Full Unanimity Mediated or FUM)
in [4] is extended further. FUM is able to guarantee unanimity
in decisions taken within the negotiation team as long as team
members share the same type of monotonicity for valuation
functions of the attributes. This assumption is relatively natural
in buyer-seller settings found in electronic commerce (e.g., a
team of buyers may value with the same type of valuation
function attributes like the price, the quality of the product, and
the time of dispatch). The proposed model relies on unanimity
rules regarding the opponent’s offer acceptance and an iterated
offer construction process to determine which offer is sent to
the opponent. This article is organized as follows. First, we
describe our negotiation model. Then, we analyze how una-
nimity is assured within the team as well as the robustness of
this model against different types of attacks. Then, we evaluate
the empirical response of the proposed model depending on
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2the impact of the different model parameters and we analyze
possible incentives that team members may have to deviate
from the proposed behavior. We then relate our work to other
works found in artificial intelligence. Finally, we summarize
the conclusions of this work and discuss our future research.
II. NEGOTIATION MODEL
Traditionally, a negotiation model is composed of a negotia-
tion protocol, which defines the set of actions that are available
for agents at each instant, and the negotiation strategy, which
defines the decision making mechanisms employed by agents
during the negotiation. In this article, we present a negotiation
model where a negotiation team negotiates with an opponent.
Despite resembling a bilateral negotiation scenario, negoti-
ations that have teams as participants are slightly different
since team dynamics also play a key role. Thus, three dif-
ferent elements have to be specified when a team negotiation
model is proposed: negotiation protocol with the opponent, the
negotiation strategy used by the opponent, and the intra-team
negotiation strategy followed by team members in order to
decide the actions to perform during the negotiation process.
An intra-team strategy defines which decisions are taken by
the team, and how and when these decisions are taken. More
specifically, it is defined by the negotiation protocol followed
among team members within the team and by the strategies
followed by agents within the team. In this section, the general
assumptions of our negotiation model and our negotiation
model itself are described. Special attention is focused on
the interactions among team members, which are carried out
before and during the negotiation process and the negotiation
strategy followed by team members within the team.
A. General Assumptions
• In our model, a group of agents has formed a team A =
{a1, a2, ..., aM} whose goal is to negotiate a successful
deal with an opponent op. However, each team member
ai may have different preferences about the negotiation
issues.
• Communications between the team and the opponent are
carried out by means of a mediator that is trusted by
the team. This mediator sends team decisions to the
opponent and receives, and later broadcasts, decisions
from the opponent to team members. Thus, the fact that
the opponent is communicating with a team is not known
by the opponent, which only interacts with the trusted
mediator. The trusted mediator also performs other tasks
that allow team members to reach unanimous decisions
regarding the offer that is sent to the opponent and
whether or not the opponent’s offer is accepted.
• The negotiation domain is comprised of n real-valued
attributes whose domain is [0, 1]. Thus, the possible
number of offers is [0, 1]n.
• A complete offer is represented as X = {x1, x2, ..., xn},
where xi is the value assigned to the i-th attribute. The
notation Xti→j is employed to indicate that X is the offer
sent by agent/team i to agent j at round t.
• Team composition will remain static during the nego-
tiation process. It is acknowledged that team members
may leave or join the group in certain specific situations.
However, membership dynamics is not considered in this
article, and it is designated as future work.
• All of the agents use linear utility functions to represent
their private preferences. Negotiation attributes are sup-
posed to be independent. Thus, the value of a specific
attribute does not affect the valuation of other attributes’
values. These functions can be formalized as follows:
Ui(X) =
n∑
j=1
wi,j Vi,j(xj) (1)
where Vi,j(.) is a monotonic valuation function that trans-
forms the attribute value to [0, 1], and wi,j is the weight or
importance that is given by the agent i to the j-th attribute.
Weights are normalized so that
∑n
j=1 wi,j = 1 holds for
every utility function. It is assumed that teammates share
the same type of monotonic valuation function (either
increasing or decreasing) for each negotiation attribute. In
contrast to team members, the opponent valuation func-
tion is always the opposite type of monotonic function.
Thus, if team members employ monotonically increasing
functions, the opponent will be modeled using monotoni-
cally decreasing functions. It is reasonable to assume this
model for valuation functions in e-commerce scenarios.
Buyers usually share the same type of valuation function
for attributes such as the price (monotonically decreas-
ing), product quality (monotonically increasing), and the
dispatch time (monotonically decreasing), whereas sellers
usually use the opposite type of monotonic functions
(monotonically increasing for price, monotonically de-
creasing for product quality, and monotonically increas-
ing for dispatch time). As for attributes’ weights, it is
considered that each team member may assign different
weight/importance to each negotiation issue. Therefore,
differences among teammates are introduced by assigning
different weights to negotiation attributes. Nevertheless,
it should be highlighted that since team members share
the same type of monotonic function, if one of the team
members increases its welfare by increasing/decreasing
one of the attribute values, the other team members will
stay at the same welfare level or they will also increase
their welfare. Thus, there is potential for cooperation
among team members. Weights given by the opponent
to attributes may also be different to those given by
teammates. Agents do not know the form of other agents’
utility functions, even if they are teammates.
• The opponent has a private deadline Top, which defines
his maximum number of negotiation rounds. Once Top
has been reached in the negotiation process, the oppo-
nent will exit the process and the negotiation will end
in failure. The team has a private joint deadline TA,
which is common information for team members. Once
this deadline has been reached, the team will exit the
negotiation process and the negotiation will end in failure.
We consider that TA has been agreed upon by team
3members before the negotiation process starts.
• The opponent has a reservation utility RUop. Any offer
whose utility is lower than RUop is rejected. Each team
member has a private reservation utility RUai , where ai
is a team member. This individual reservation utility is
not shared among teammates. Therefore, a team member
ai rejects any offer whose value is under RUai . In this
setting, reservation utilities represent the individual utility
of each agent if the negotiation process fails.
B. Negotiation Protocol with the Opponent
In this section, the negotiation process between a negotiation
team and an opponent is studied. The fact that one of the
parties is a team is transparent to the other party. Thus,
superficially, the scenario resembles a bilateral negotiation
scenario. Because of this, we decided to model the interaction
between the team and the opponent as an alternating bilateral
negotiation process [5]. In this protocol, one of the two agents
is the initiator and sends the first offer to the other party
or responding agent. The responding agent receives the offer
and decides whether he/she accepts the offer or he/she sends
a counter-offer as response. If the responding agent sends a
counter-offer, the initiator agent has to decide whether he/she
accepts the counter-offer or not. If the counter-offer is rejected,
a new round starts and the process is repeated again until a
deal is accepted (successful negotiation) or one of the parties
decides to quit the negotiation since its deadline has been
reached (failed negotiation). In our negotiation model, we
consider that a trusted mediator is responsible for sending team
decisions to the opponent and broadcasting opponent decisions
to team members. Nevertheless, this mediator not only acts
as a coordinator but also helps the team to reach unanimous
agreements by means of an iterated process for offer genera-
tion and unanimity rules for opponent offer acceptance.
C. Opponent Negotiation Strategy
A negotiation strategy defines the decision-making of an
agent in a negotiation process. In this case, the negotiation
strategy is constituted by the concession strategy, which marks
the aspiration level of the opponent in terms of utility at
each negotiation round, and the acceptance criterion, which
determines whether the team offer is accepted or not.
• It is assumed that the opponent uses a concession strategy
to carry out during the negotiation process. A concession
strategy typically (although not necessarily) starts by de-
manding the maximum aspiration and, as the negotiation
process advances, the aspiration demanded tends to be
lowered. The amount of concession/reduction applied at
each step may depend on the specific tactic selected
by the opponent. In this article, our main focus of
interest is the general behavior of the proposed intra-team
strategy. Thus, a set of well-known negotiation tactics
was selected as the opponent negotiation strategy: time-
dependent tactics [6], [7]. We formalized time-dependent
tactics as suggested by [7]:
sop(t) = 1− (1−RUop)( t
Top
)
1
βop (2)
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Fig. 1. This figure represents an activity diagram of the general process
followed by the team in our model.
where t is the current negotiation round and βop is a
negotiation strategy parameter (concession speed) which
determines how concessions are made towards RUop. On
the one hand, when βop = 1 the concession is linear and
each negotiation round the same amount of concession is
performed, and when βop < 1 the concession is boulware
and very little is conceded at the start of the negotiation
process but the agent concedes faster as the negotiation
deadline approaches. On the other hand, when βop > 1
the concession is conceder and the agents concede fast
towards the reservation utility in the first rounds.
• The opponent uses an offer acceptance criterion acop(.)
during the negotiation process. It is formalized as follows:
acop(X) =
{
accept if sop(t+ 1) ≤ Uop(X)
reject otherwise (3)
where t is the current round, X is the offer received from
the team, Uop(.) is the utility function of the opponent,
and sop(.) is the opponent concession strategy. Thus, an
offer is accepted by op if it reports a utility that is equal
to or greater than the utility of the offer that op would
propose in the next round.
D. Intra-Team Strategy: Negotiation Protocol within the Team
The negotiation protocol followed by team members for
team communications can be divided into two different phases:
the protocol followed during the pre-negotiation, and the
protocol used during the negotiation process. Both of them
are thoroughly described below. A general overview of the
process followed by team members can be observed in Fig. 1.
1) Pre-negotiation: In the pre-negotiation, team members
confidentially share certain information about their preferences
with the trusted mediator. Each team member specifies which
attributes’ decision rights it is willing to hand over when
4{Start pre-negotiation phase}
∀i, j, I(i, j) = true
Ask for NIai to each ai
Receive responses NIai from each ai
for ai ∈ A do
for j ∈ NIai do
I(i, j) = false
end for
end for
{End pre-negotiation phase}
Fig. 2. Pre-negotiation protocol followed by team A and the trusted mediator.
In this schema, we show the protocol from the point of view of the mediator.
The protocol followed by team members is analogous and straight-forward.
the team proposes an offer. It is reasonable that each team
member may be willing to sacrifice decision rights pertaining
to negotiation attributes that have little importance or no
importance at all for one’s own interests. This decision may
help to find a more satisfactory agreement for the opponent
while maintaining good quality for one’s own utility. The fact
that some attributes may yield little or no importance at all for
some team members is also feasible in a team setting, since
some of these attributes may have been introduced to satisfy
the interests of a subgroup of team members.
Therefore, for each team member ai, the trusted mediator
asks the set of attributes NIai whose decision rights conform
the set of rights that ai is willing to hand over when building
an offer for the opponent. This information is annotated by the
mediator in an interest matrix I . Each matrix position I(i, j)
indicates whether the team member ai holds decision rights
for attribute j (I(i, j) = true) or not (I(i, j) = false). How
each team member ai specifies this set of attributes NIai is
described later in Subsection II-E. The communication pro-
tocol carried out during the pre-negotiation phase, described
from the point of view of the mediator, is shown in Fig. 2.
2) Negotiation: Three possible actions can be carried out
by the negotiation team at each negotiation round t: (a)
accept/reject opponent offer acA(Xtop→A) (Offer acceptance
in Fig. 1); (b) send an offer/counter-offer XtA→op (Offer
construction in Fig. 1); (c) abandon the negotiation process.
This last action is performed when the team deadline TA
is reached. Thus, when t > TA, the mediator informs the
opponent about the team’s withdrawal. The mediator also
has a very important role in the coordination mechanisms
employed by the team to decide upon action (a) and (b). The
coordination processes (a) and (b) are described in a detailed
way. Furthermore, a finite state machine formalization of the
negotiation from the point of view of the mediator can be
observed in Fig. 3. It shows the offer construction and the
opponent offer acceptance processes.
a) Offer acceptance: When team A has to decide
whether or not to accept the opponent’s offer (acA(Xtop→A)),
first, the mediator receives the opponent’s offer Xtop→A. This
offer is publicly announced to all of the team members by the
mediator. Then, the mediator opens a private voting process
where each team member ai should specify whether or not
it supports acceptance of the opponent’s offer acai(X
t
op→A).
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Fig. 3. Finite state machine formalization of the negotiation from the point
of view of the mediator. The transitions follow the format Events / Actions.
Messages sent by the mediator follow the format <Recipient,Message>.
Receive Xtop→A
Broadcast Xtop→A in A (start voting process)
Receive response acai(X
t
op→A) from each team member ai
in A
votes = 0
for ai ∈ A do
if acai(Xtop→A) = true then
votes = votes+ 1
end if
end for
if votes = |A| then
acA(X
t
op→A) = true
else
acA(X
t
op→A) = false
end if
Fig. 4. Negotiation protocol followed by team A and the trusted mediator
to decide the acceptance of the opponent offer. In this schema, we show the
protocol from the point of view of the mediator. The protocol followed by
team members is analogous and straight-forward.
How each team member decides whether or not the opponent
offer is supported will be described in Subsection II-E. Once
every vote has been received, the mediator counts the number
of positive votes (votes that support the opponent’s offer). The
offer is accepted if the number of positive votes is equal to the
number of team members. Otherwise, the offer is rejected. A
complete view of this communication protocol can be observed
in Fig. 4.
b) Offer construction: The mediator coordinates an it-
erated offer-building process in order to ensure unanimity in
the offer XtA→op sent to the opponent. For that purpose, each
5attribute value is adjusted one by one. Before the iterated
process starts, the mediator considers every team member ai as
an active member in the offer construction process. Once the
iterated offer construction process starts, the trusted mediator
selects an attribute j from the set of attributes that have not
yet been set. Given the partial offer X
′t
A→op built until the
moment, the mediator asks each active team member ai who
is interested in j (I(i, j) = true) about the value xai,j needed
to get as close as possible to its current aspiration level sai(t).
When private responses have been gathered from every team
member, the mediator decides a value xj for the attribute
j. Here, the morphology of the proposed utility functions
comes into play. Due to the fact that team members share
the same type of monotonicity for valuation functions, the
trusted mediator can aggregate agents’ opinions by means
of the max function (monotonically increasing) or the min
function (monotonically decreasing). As will be proved in
Section III, the value decided for xj ensures unanimity among
team members under certain assumptions. The value xj is set
in a new partial offer X
′t
A→op which is publicly announced to
team members. Then, the mediator asks every active agent in
the offer construction process whether or not the new partial
offer is satisfactory at round t, ac′ai(X
′t
A→op). Those agents
that agree with the current state of X
′t
A→op are eliminated from
the active list. Those attributes which are not interesting for
any team member are maximized according to the opponent’s
preferences. The process steps back to the selection of a new
attribute j until all of them have been set. A more detailed
description of this process can be observed in Fig. 5. As will
be reviewed in Section III, when agents comply with certain
assumptions, the proposed iterated process is able to reach an
offer that is supported by all of the team members at each
negotiation round (unanimity). Obviously, the resultant offer
depends on the agenda of attributes employed by the mediator.
Since unanimity is guaranteed independently of the agenda
employed by the mediator, the offer constructed should be
as satisfactory as possible for the opponent. Ideally, the team
should try to fulfill its own interests with those attributes that
are less important for the opponent.
E. Intra-Team Strategy: Team Members’ Strategy within the
Team
This subsection specifies how team members answer the me-
diator’s petitions. On the one hand, during the pre-negotiation,
team members decide upon which attribute decision rights are
handed over. On the other hand, during the negotiation, agents
have to decide whether they accept the opponent’s offer and
which values should be set for the offer to be sent to the
opponent. The behavior of team members in these decision
making processes is described below.
1) Pre-negotiation: In the pre-negotiation phase, the me-
diator asks each team member the set of attributes’ decision
rights that it is willing to hand over. Its size may range from
0 attributes to the whole set of attributes. How many decision
rights ai is willing to hand over depends on an individual and
private value ai ∈ [0, 1]. When ai = 0, the agent is only
willing to hand over rights that yield no interest at all (i.e.,
X
′t
A→op = ∅
A′ = A
{For each attribute}
for j ∈ N do
V = ∅
{Check opinion of team members who are active in the
building phase and are interested in the attribute}
for ai ∈ A′ ∧ I(i, j) = true do
Ask for xai,j
Receive xai,j
V = V
⋃
xai,j
end for
{Aggregate agents’ opinions}
if |V | = 0 then
xj = best value for opponent(j)
else
xj = max(V ) or min(V )
end if
X
′t
A→op = X
′t
A→op
⋃
xj
Make public new X
′t
A→op among team members
{Update list of agents who are active in the building
phase}
for ai ∈ A′ do
Ask for ac′ai(X
′t
A→op)
Receive ac′ai(X
′t
A→op)
if ac′ai(X
′t
A→op) = true then
A′ = A′ − ai
end if
end for
end for
XtA→op = X
′t
A→op
Fig. 5. Negotiation protocol followed by team A and the trusted mediator
to build an offer to be sent to the opponent. In this schema, we show the
protocol from the point of view of the mediator. The protocol followed by
team members is analogous and straight-forward.
attributes j whose wai,j = 0), whereas when ai = 1, the
agent is willing to hand over all of the attributes’ decision
rights. The set of attributes NIai whose decision rights are
handed over by agent ai follow this equation:∑
j∈NIai
wai,j ≤ ai (4)
Thus, ai acts as an upper limit that determines the total
importance given by ai to the attributes whose decision rights
are handed over. Given a value for ai , there are multiple sets
NIai that fulfill Eq. 4. A reasonable heuristic is to assume
that the agent is willing to concede as many decision rights
as possible since this will enhance the possibility of finding
an agreement with the opponent. Hence, each team member
ai chooses the largest possible set NIai that fulfills Eq. 4.
2) Negotiation: In the negotiation process, two different
decisions are taken by the team: whether or not they accept
the opponent’s offer, and which offer is sent to the opponent.
First, the decision making mechanism acai(.), used by each
agent ai to decide whether or not it supports the opponent’s
offer, is described. It seems appropriate to assume that the
6agent will accept the opponent’s offer if it reports a utility
that is greater than or equal to the aspiration level marked by
the concession strategy in the next round:
acai(X) =
{
true if sai(t+ 1) ≤ Uai(X)
false otherwise (5)
where true means that the agent supports the opponent’s offer,
false has the opposite meaning, and sai(.) is the concession
strategy employed by agent ai to calculate the aspiration
level at each negotiation round t. Regarding the concession
strategy employed by team members, it is considered that
team members have agreed upon a time-based concession
strategy with a common βA. Thus, the concession strategy
sai(.) followed by each team member ai can be formalized
as depicted below. It is a modification of the well-known
concession strategy used in Equation 2.
sai(t) = (1− ai)− (1− ai −RUai)(
t
TA
)
1
βA (6)
For the expression above, it can be observed that each agent’s
aspiration level, despite being governed by the same βA,
depends on the private reservation utility of each agent RUai .
ai acts as a limit for the maximum utility demanded by the
concession strategy. Since the agent has handed over decision
rights for a set of attributes whose weights sum up to ai , the
maximum utility that the agent is able to demand by itself is
(1− ai). This is reflected in the equation above.
Second, in the case of the iterated construction process, team
members take two decisions: which value xai,j is requested
for attribute j given the partial offer X
′t
A→op, and whether or
not the new partial offer is acceptable ac′ai(X
′t
A→op). When
requesting a value for j, each team member communicates
anonymously the value xai,j which gets as close as possible to
its desired aspiration level sai(t). This value can be calculated
by obtaining the attribute value xai,j whose weighted utility
(wai,jVai,j(xai,j)) is the closest to the utility needed by the
partial offer in order to reach the desired utility level (sai(t)−
Uai(X
′t
A→op)) :
xai,j = argmin
x∈[0,1]
(sai(t)− Uai(X
′t
A→op)− wai,jVai,j(x)) (7)
where xai,j is set so that the new offer’s utility does not exceed
the aspiration level marked by the concession strategy:
sai(t)− Uai(X
′t
A→op)− wai,jVai,j(xai,j) ≥ 0 (8)
Once the partial offer X
′t
A→op has been updated by the
mediator, those agents that are still active in the construction
process are asked whether or not the new offer is acceptable
for the current negotiation round. Again, we consider that a
partial offer is acceptable for an agent ai if it reports a utility
that is greater than or equal to the aspiration level marked by
its concession strategy:
ac′ai(X) =
{
true if Uai(X) ≥ sai(t)
false otherwise (9)
where true indicates that the partial offer is acceptable at its
current state for agent ai, and false indicates the opposite. A
simplistic trace of a negotiation round, and how team members
would behave, can be found in Fig. 6.
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze some of the important character-
istics of our negotiation model in depth. The two main aspects
that we analyze are how unanimous decisions are guaranteed
regarding team decisions and how robust the proposed model
is against manipulations. In the first case, the model assures
that each team member gets a utility that is greater than or
equal to its current aspiration level. In the second case, we
analyze how the proposed model is robust against agents from
the opponent, but it is easily attacked by agents from the
competition that try to sabotage a deal with the opponent.
A. Unanimity within the Team
As mentioned in this article, the proposed negotiation model
allows team members to reach unanimity in team’s decisions.
These decisions include the offer that is sent to the opponent
and the acceptance/rejection of the opponent’s offers. In the
latter, it is clear that the proposed acceptance mechanism en-
sures unanimity since an opponent offer is only accepted when
it is considered acceptable by all of the team members. In the
former, the definition of unanimity is not straightforward.
We define that an offer sent to the opponent XtA→op is a
strict unanimous decision for the team when, for any team
member ai, the offer reports a utility that is greater than or
equal to its current aspiration level sai(t):
∀ai∈AUai(XtA→op) ≥ sai(t) (10)
Achieving this definition of unanimity within the team en-
sures that if a final agreement is found, it reports a utility that is
greater than or equal to each agent’s private reservation utility.
In order to achieve the proposed definition of unanimous
decision, some assumptions have to be made regarding the
behavior of team members. These assumptions have already
been presented in this article. Basically, team members have
to be truthful in their responses to the mediator, following the
behavior specified in Eq. 7,8 and 9. Next, we prove that, if
team members follow these behaviors, unanimity is achieved
in team’s decisions according to Equation 10.
Proof: ∀ai∈AUai(XtA→op) ≥ sai(t)
subject to: Eq. 7, Eq. 8, Eq. 9, and the same type of monotonic-
ity for valuation functions Vai,j in team members’ utility func-
tions. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that team mem-
bers’ valuation functions are monotonically increasing for any
negotiation attribute. It should be pointed out that, in that case,
the aggregation operation carried out by the trusted mediator is
the max operator. In any case, for any attribute j, its value will
be determined as xj = max(xa1,j , xa2,j , ..., xaM ,j) and then
it holds true that ∀ai ∈ A,wai,jVai,j(xj) ≥ wai,jVai,j(xai,j).
The proof is quite straightforward. When the mediator declares
that an attribute j must be set, three different situations may
arise for an agent ai:
• ai has already reached its aspiration level with the partial
offer Uai(X
′t
A→op) ≥ sai(t). Therefore, the value deter-
mined for xj will add utility to the partial offer and the
utility reported to ai will further exceed its aspirations
Uai(X
′t
A→op) + wai,jVai,j(xj) ≥ sai(t).
7Fig. 6. The figure shows a simplistic trace of the proposed model during one negotiation round t. The team is composed of three buyers (a1, a2, a3),
whereas the opponent is a seller. The upper left table shows the utility functions of team members and their aspiration levels at round t and t+1. The upper
right table shows team members’ valuation functions for negotiation attributes and the agenda learnt by the mediator. The negotiation attribute are p (price,
monotonically decreasing), q (quality, monotonically increasing), and d (payment date time, monotonically increasing). The lower table is the trace of the
negotiation round. In (1), the first attribute of the agenda xd is set, but it should be highlighted that a3 does not participate in its construction since a3 = 0
and, thus, a3 has handed the decision rights over xd during the pre-negotiation. After (4), a2 does not participate in the offer construction since it has reached
its desired aspiration with the value set for attributes xd and xq . Finally, in (7) the opponent’s counteroffer is rejected since the offer is not acceptable for a3.
• ai can reach its current aspiration level sai(t) if it asks
for a value xai,j . Thus, Uai(X
′t
A→op)+wai,jVi,j(xai,j) =
sai(t). Since the aggregation operation is xj =
max(xa1,j , xa2,j , ..., xaM ,j), the new partial offer will
have a utility that is equal to or greater than its aspirations,
Uai(X
′t
A→op) + wai,jVai,j(xj) ≥ sai(t).
• ai cannot reach its aspirations by just setting xj . In
this case, ai will demand the maximum possible value
for j and then xj = xai,j . ai will have to reach its
aspiration level by adjusting the next attributes in the
agenda. In the worst case scenario, the next attribute to
be set xN is the last one in the agenda. This means that
ai has demanded the maximum value for the previous
attributes and succeeded in getting its desired value for
them. Thus, before the last attribute is set, the utility
reported by the partial offer to ai is
N−1∑
j
wai,j . Since
N∑
j
wai,j = 1 and 0 ≤ sai(t) ≤ 1, the agent will reach
its aspiration level by demanding a value for xN that
fulfills Vai,N (xN ) ≥
sai(t)−
N−1∑
j
wai,j
wai,N
, which is ensured
thanks to the morphology of the valuation functions
(0 ≤ Vai,j(x) ≤ 1).
One might wonder whether or not it is reasonable to think
that agents are truthful in this process. However, members
are not tempted to demand lesser value for attributes since
the process would not ensure that the final agreement would
achieve its current aspiration level. On the other hand, it is
true that agents may be inclined to demand a greater value for
attributes since the process ensures that the offer will be more
profitable for them. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that,
generally, if more value is demanded for attributes the offer
may be less profitable for the opponent and the probabilities
of reaching an agreement may be greatly reduced. This issue
is studied in Subsection IV-D, where we analyze whether or
not team members have strong incentives to deviate from the
proposed behavior.
B. Manipulation within the Team
1) Opponent: Here, we refer to agents that infiltrate the
team in order to increase the quality of the final agreement
from the point of view of the opponent party. In a negotiation
team setting formed by buyers, we are concerned about the
fact that some seller parties may attempt to introduce agents
among team members. This way, opponents may be able to
maximize their own preferences by manipulating the decisions
taken by the team. However, our proposed negotiation model
is robust to this kind of manipulation.
Let us imagine a situation where a negotiation team wants
to buy a product and a seller has been able to infiltrate agents
in the team. Due to the mechanism that is employed to build
the offer sent to the opponent and the mechanism employed to
decide upon whether or not to accept the opponent’s offer, it is
not possible for opponent agents to manipulate the decisions
taken within the team. Regarding the iterated offer construction
process, an opponent agent would try to demand values that
are close to the preferences of the opponent. In a generic
electronic commerce application, an opponent agent might
demand high values for the price and the dispatch date and low
values for the product quality. However, the aggregation rules
employed by the trusted mediator (max or min depending on
the type of monotonic function that represents the preferences
of the team members) will ensure that team preferences prevail
independently of the number of infiltrated opponent agents.
As for the unanimous voting process, opponent agents might
try to engage team members in accepting the opponent’s offer.
However, this is not possible due to the fact that as long as one
team member does not support the opponent’s offer, it will not
be accepted. Thus, it does not require further demonstration.
8This is the case even in situations where the group of opponent
agents is larger than the number of real team members.
For instance, let us imagine a negotiation team, formed by
5 buyers, that negotiates with a seller. Two agents (a1, a2) of
such team are real buyers, whereas the other three (a3, a4, a5)
are agents infiltrated by the seller. The negotiation problem is
based on two negotiation attributes, price and quality, whose
domains have been scaled to [0, 1]. The valuation function
used for the price in the case of the buyers is assumed to be
monotonically decreasing (buyers prefer low prices to high
prices), and the type of monotonic function used for the
quality is assumed to be monotonically increasing (buyers
prefer high quality to low quality). Thus, the mediator uses
the min function to aggregate the price attribute, and the max
function to aggregate the quality attribute. Assuming that the
opponent’s valuation functions are of the opposite monotonic
type to those of the buyers, team members first demand the
following values for the price: xa1,price = 0.1, xa2,price = 0.2,
xa3,price = 0.9, xa4,price = 0.85, xa5,price = 1. The mediator
aggregates such values and the final value for the attribute
price is xprice = min(0.1, 0.2, 0.9, 0.85, 1) = 0.1, which is
actually preferred by the two real buyers. Thus, even if the
number of opponent agents is larger than the number of real
buyers, infiltrated agents from the opponent are not able to
manipulate the team. The example for the quality attribute
is analogous and does not require further explanation. In the
end, the preferences of real buyers will prevail over opponent
agents’ demands and the team is not manipulated.
2) Competitors: Another kind of possible manipulation
is the one carried out by competitor agents. Competitors
are buyer agents (in the case that the team is made up of
buyer agents) that are interested in the same product as the
team. Some competitors may be interested in sabotaging team
deals if that assures that competitors get better deals from
the opponent. This is especially true in environments where
goods or services are limited (e.g., personal sellers on Ebay).
Thus, competitor agents may attempt to prevent the team from
reaching an agreement with the opponent.
Even though the proposed model is robust against opponent
agents, robustness is not maintained when dealing with infil-
trated competitor agents. In that case, the strengths shown by
the model become its weaknesses. In the voting process carried
out to decide upon whether or not to accept the opponent’s
offer, only a single agent is needed to manipulate the process
and prevent the team from accepting the opponent’s offers. On
the other hand, competitor agents may manipulate the offer
construction phase by being highly demanding. In a generic
electronic commerce application, the competitor agent would
demand very low values for the price, short dispatch dates and
very high product quality. This way, competitor agents make
offers extremely undesirable for opponent agents, preventing
the team from reaching a final agreement with the opponent.
Due to the aggregation operators employed by the trusted
mediator, only one competitor agent is needed to manipulate
the offer construction process. Thus, this model should be
employed only when team members are extremely sure that no
competitor agent has infiltrated the team. It would be possible
to employ sophisticated mechanisms to detect these agents;
however this is a topic for future research.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we explore the impact of the different
parameters of our proposed model. More specifically, we
study the importance of the agenda of issues imposed by
the mediator on the negotiation process, the impact of the
number of decision rights that are handed over during the
pre-negotiation, the empirical robustness of the model against
attacks (i.e., agents from the competition that try to sabotage
the negotiation), and whether or not team members have
incentives to deviate from the proposed strategy.
A. Studying the Impact of Intra-Team Agenda
The mediator uses an agenda to determine which attributes
are set first in the iterated building process. A reasonable
heuristic is to try to satisfy team members with those attributes
that are less important for the opponent. Otherwise, the resul-
tant offer may be too demanding and the negotiation process
may end in failure. Thus, ideally, the agenda should order the
attributes in ascendant order of importance for the opponent.
However, it is acknowledged that the situations where the
opponent may reveal its full ranking of preferences are very
limited or almost non-existent. Thus, it is necessary to provide
the mediator with mechanisms that approximately learn the
opponent’s preferences. In this article, we propose a simple
learning mechanism that is based on the idea that one agent
may concede less in its important attributes during the first
negotiation rounds. The mechanism takes into account the
offers received in the first k negotiation rounds and sums up
the accumulated amount of concession for each negotiation
attribute. Then, the mediator orders the attributes in descendant
order according to the amount of concession and it becomes
the agenda of attributes for the negotiation. If the number of
current rounds is lower than k, the agenda is built based on
the available information. Thus, in the first few rounds, the
learning mechanism is not expected to accurately match the
opponent’s preferences; however, as the negotiation process
advances, more information is available and the learning
mechanism should match the opponent’s preferences better.
In the first experiment, we decided to study the importance
of the agenda on the negotiation process. While every team
member gets a utility that is greater than or equal to its desired
aspiration level, the offer may be more or less demanding for
the opponent. If the offer is less demanding for the opponent,
it is more probable that it will be accepted by him. Therefore,
we decided to study the utility reported by the teams’ offer
to the opponent at each negotiation round. We simulated a
negotiation process where offers are not accepted (i.e., it
always reaches the negotiation deadline) just to observe the
utility of the offers proposed by the team from the opponent’s
perspective. Two different environments were tested: one with
a short deadline Top = TA = 10, and one with a long deadline
Top = TA = 50. Other parameters were set to the standard
values of our negotiation model: βop = βA = 1, ai = 0,
and RUop = RUai = 0. Three different types of agendas
for the FUM model were compared: a perfect agenda where
9the mediator knows perfectly the order of importance given
by the opponent (FUM-perfect); the simple learning method
described above (FUM-simple); and a random agenda that
is built at each negotiation round (FUM-random). For FUM-
simple, the number of initial negotiation rounds to be taken
into account was set to k = bTA4 c. Additionally, the proposed
negotiation model is compared with a representative model
(RE) and a similarity simple voting model (SSV) which were
proposed in our previous work [4]. On the one hand, the
representative model does not assure any kind of consensus
among team members. One of the team members is chosen
as representative and decides on behalf of the team according
to its own private utility function. On the other hand, SSV
uses majority/plurality to take team decisions. Each round,
each team member is allowed to propose an offer to be sent
to the opponent. This offer is proposed based on a similarity
heuristic that considers the last opponent’s offer and the last
offer proposed by team members in the previous round. These
two models are expected to be less demanding in terms of
utility due to the fact that less conflict is introduced with
the opponent (i.e., a fewer number of team members may
reach their aspiration level). A total of 100 random teams with
size M = 4 and random utility functions (4 attributes) were
confronted with 11 randomly generated opponents. In order
to capture stochastic variations in the different models, each
possible negotiation was repeated 4 times. Thus, a total of
4400 negotiations were carried out per model and environment
(i.e., short/long deadline). The results for this first experiment
can be observed in Fig. 7.
As can be observed in the short deadline scenario (Fig. 7),
the offers proposed by the representative model are more at-
tractive for the opponent. This is reasonable since, in this case,
the representative only negotiates attending to its own utility
function. Therefore, it results in less conflict with the opponent
and more trade-off possibilities. The behavior observed for the
perfect agenda model and the similarity simple voting model
are more surprising. Even though, in the first rounds, SSV
proposes offers that report more utility for the opponent than
those built by the perfect agenda model, as the negotiation
advances, the perfect agenda model outperforms SSV. This
happens at negotiation round 6. This may be explained by
the fact that, at that point, more trade-off possibilities arise
between all of the team members and the opponent, and the
perfect agenda model is capable of exploiting them while
assuring the desired aspiration level for each teammate. As
for the simple agenda model, it performs slightly better than
the random agenda model, but worse than the other methods in
the experiment. This is explainable by the fact that, since the
negotiation deadline is short, limited information can be used
to learn the opponent’s preferences. Consequently, the agenda
built is closer to a random agenda than to the perfect agenda.
In the case of the long deadline scenario, a similar tendency
can be observed. Nevertheless, there are some differences
that are worth highlighting. First, the representative model
is still the one that is the most attractive for the opponent’s
interests. However, in this scenario, both the perfect agenda
model and the simple agenda model are able to outperform
SSV at some points of the negotiation process. Obviously, this
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Fig. 7. The upper graphic shows the average utility reported to the opponent
by the team’s proposal at each negotiation round for the short deadline
scenario. The lower graphic shows the results for the long deadline scenario.
happens earlier for the perfect agenda model since it represents
perfect knowledge about the opponent’s preferences. Hence, it
is able to take advantage of possible trade-offs earlier in the
negotiation. It happens approximately at round 22. Regarding
the simple agenda model, it is able to outperform SSV around
round 33. Differently to the first scenario, since the amount of
information to learn from is greater, the simple agenda model
is able to get closer to the perfect agenda and offer more
attractive offers to the opponent.
In conclusion, methods proposed in the literature like RE
and SSV (in the short deadline scenario) are less demanding
for the opponent; however it should be pointed out that they
do not ensure unanimity as FUM. Thus, the preferences of
all the team members are not represented in the deals found
by RE and SSV. In fact, we ran additional tests to ascertain
this conclusion. The experimental conditions were set to the
same parameters found in this first batch of experiments, but
in this experiment the two parties were able to accept offers,
thus ending the negotiation before the deadline. We tested
the performance of RE, SSV, and FUM-simple according to
different quality measures such as the minimum utility of the
team members and the average utility of the team members.
The results of this experiment can be observed in Table I.
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Short deadline Long deadline
Method Min. Ave. Min. Ave.
RE [0.10-0.11] [0.42-0.43] [0.11-0.12] [0.45-0.46]
SSV [0.33-0.34] [0.52-0.53] [0.30-0.31] [0.56-0.57]
FUM-simple [0.41-0.42] [0.68-0.69] [0.50-0.51] [0.74-0.75]
TABLE I
THIS TABLE SHOWS THE QUALITY OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT. VALUES
SHOWN ARE CONFIDENCE INTERVALS (95%) FOR THE MEAN. MIN:
MINIMUM UTILITY OF TEAM MEMBERS, AVE: AVERAGE UTILITY OF
TEAM MEMBERS
As shown, FUM-simple is able to obtain better agreements in
terms of utility (both measures) for the team members. Thus,
the results suggest the aforementioned claim: even though RE
and SSV are less demanding for the opponent, they do not
represent the preferences of the team members as FUM does.
B. Studying the Impact of ai
In this second experiment, we decided to study the impact
of ai on the team’s performance. It seems reasonable to think
that low values of this parameter should help to construct
offers that are more interesting for the opponent, but high
values should impact negatively on the utility obtained by
ai. We devised an experiment where the value of ai was
set in a uniform way for all of the team members. More
specifically, we used the values 0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.07, 0.1, 0.12,
0.15, 0.17, 0.2 for ai . For the quality measures, we observed
the minimum and the average utility of the team members.
Two different environments were tested: short/long deadline,
whose lengths are drawn from the uniform distributions Top =
TA = U [5, 10], Top = TA = U [30, 60], respectively. The
concession speed for both parties was set to be drawn from
βop = βA = U [0.4, 0.99] since initial experiments have
suggested that boulware strategies may provide more utility
for both parties in absence of other outside options [4]. The
reservation utility for the agents was drawn from a uniform
distribution RUop = RUai = U [0, 0.25]. In this case, the
learning method for the agenda was set to FUM-simple and
the number of initial rounds to be taken into account was
set to k = bTA4 c. A total of 100 randomly generated teams
with size M = 4 and random utility functions (4 attributes)
were confronted with 12 randomly generated opponents. Each
possible negotiation was repeated 4 times. Thus, a total of
4800 negotiation were carried out per model and environment.
The results for this experiment are shown in Table II.
The results show a slight decrease in the utility (minimum
utility and average utility) as ai gets larger. This behavior
is found in almost every scenario tested. Those configurations
that do not show this pattern usually obtain very similar results
for all of the configurations. Thus, the agents should choose
ai = 0 independently of the type of scenario where they
negotiate. In the best case, the agent will get a slightly better
utility than other values of the parameter. In the worst case
scenario, the agent will get a very similar utility to other values
of the parameter ai . The value ai = 0 corresponds to the
agents only handing over those decision rights associated to
attributes that yield no interest at all for the agent.
Long deadline Short deadline
ai Min. Ave. Min. Ave.
0.00 0.49 0.72 0.35 0.60
0.02 0.50 0.71 0.37 0.61
0.05 0.49 0.68 0.37 0.58
0.07 0.48 0.67 0.37 0.57
0.10 0.49 0.66 0.37 0.56
0.12 0.48 0.65 0.37 0.56
0.15 0.48 0.64 0.37 0.55
0.17 0.47 0.63 0.38 0.54
0.20 0.46 0.61 0.38 0.55
TABLE II
THIS TABLE SHOWS THE AVERAGE IMPACT OF ai ON TEAM
PERFORMANCE. MIN: MINIMUM UTILITY OF TEAM MEMBERS, AVE:
AVERAGE UTILITY OF TEAM MEMBERS
It can also be observed that the average utility is impacted
more negatively by increment of the ai parameter in the
long deadline scenario than in the short deadline scenario.
A thorough analysis of our results gave an answer to this
phenomenon. The results suggest that higher values of ai
reduce the average utility for the team members. However,
the number of negotiations that ended with no agreement in
the long deadline scenario when ai = 0 was 151 (3.1% of
the negotiation cases ended with an average utility equal to 0),
whereas the number of failed negotiations was 404 (8.41%)
when ai = 0 and the deadline was short. As ai was increased
to 0.2, the number of failed negotiations decreased to 35
(0.7%) in the long deadline scenario and 91 (1.8%) in the
short deadline scenario. Thus, higher values for ai contribute
to reaching an agreement in cases where no deal was found.
This effect is more notorious in the short deadline scenario.
Since the number of failed negotiations is greatly reduced in
the short deadline scenario, the negative effect of higher ai is
moderated since the new negotiations contribute with values
for the average utility that are greater than or equal to 0.
Despite this, the reduction in the number of failed negotiations
is not enough to counter the negative impact of ai .
In general, ai can be considered as some sort of moderator
for the initial demand. According to our results, in general,
agents should not give up any decision right over an attribute
that yields interest for him. Only those decision rights associ-
ated to attributes that yield no interest at all should be handed
over. Hence, team members should always start demanding
their highest aspiration level. This situation resembles results
obtained in bilateral negotiation [6], where it was found that
if the deadline is reasonably long, the agent should start
demanding values close to their maximum utility.
C. Studying the Impact of Infiltrated Competitors
In Section III, we described the robustness of the proposed
negotiation model against agents that try to sabotage the
negotiation team. It was shown that agents from the oppo-
nent may not be able to manipulate the negotiation process.
Nevertheless, when agents from the competition infiltrate the
team, they may be able to stop the team from reaching an
agreement. Thus, one of our concerns is how different levels
of risk may affect the performance of teams acting according
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to our model. We decided to test the performance of FUM in
different adverse negotiation scenarios.
These scenarios differ in the probability P that at least
one of the team members comes from the competition. The
infiltrated agent tries to stop the team from reaching an
agreement with the opponent. To do so, the agent always
rejects the offer received from the opponent and is extremely
demanding when asking for value in the iterated offer build-
ing process. Since an agent that always asks for the most
demanding value can be easily spotted (i.e., the agent does
not concede at all), we decided to model this competitor agent
as an agent that tries to mimic a team member with a high
reservation utility RUai . This way, the agent concedes during
the negotiation process, but its requests are always high since
its reservation utility is high. Hence, we decided that the
infiltrated agent would follow the same concession strategy
as the rest of the teammates, but the infiltrated agent would
have an unexpectedly high reservation utility drawn from the
uniform distribution RUai = U [0.8, 1.0]. According to this
strategy, an infiltrated agent would be more difficult to identify
than an agent that always asks for the most demanding value.
However, this does not assure that the team will be sabotaged.
This will also depend on other factors such as deadline lengths
and concession strategies carried out by both parties.
In this experiment, we propose to analyze the per-
formance of the FUM model in scenarios where P =
{0, 25, 50, 75, 100%}. Additionally, we include two modifi-
cations of FUM with two different unanimity levels: 50%
(FUM50), and 75% (FUM75). These levels of unanimity
are applied when accepting the opponent’s offer. The infil-
trated agent will act according to the βA = U [0.4, 0.99]
imposed by the team, but he will act as an agent with a
high reservation utility RU = U [0.8, 1.0]. The reservation
utility for the rest of the agents was drawn from a uniform
distribution RUop = RUai = U [0, 0.25]. As in previous
experiments, the concession speed of the opponent was set to
βop = U [0.4, 0.99] and we simulated two different scenarios:
one with short deadlines (TA = Top = U [5, 10]) and one
with long deadlines (TA = Top = U [30, 60]). For ai , it was
set to ai = 0 since the previous experiment showed that it
may be more beneficial in terms of utility to team members.
The learning method for the agenda was set to FUM-simple
and the number of initial negotiation rounds to be taken into
account was set to k = bTA4 c. A total of 100 randomly
generated teams with size M = 4 and random utility functions
(4 attributes) were confronted with 12 randomly generated
opponents. Each negotiation was repeated 4 times. Thus, a
total of 4800 negotiations were carried out per model and
environment. The results are shown in Table III.
The results showed the expected tendency: as the probability
P increased, the utilitarian values for the team members
decreased. This effect is observable due to the fact that the
environment was more distrustful and the agents were able to
successfully sabotage the team by acting as highly demanding
team members. The average utility of the team members was
reduced by 67%-73% in the highest risk scenario for FUM.
As a solution for this problem, other unanimity rules could
be useful. In fact, it can be observed that when P is high,
FUM FUM75 FUM50
P Long Short Long Short Long Short
0.0% 0.71 0.61 0.67 0.59 0.58 0.53
25% 0.60 0.50 0.65 0.56 0.58 0.51
50% 0.47 0.38 0.61 0.53 0.56 0.50
75% 0.33 0.28 0.59 0.48 0.55 0.50
100% 0.24 0.17 0.56 0.46 0.53 0.48
TABLE III
THIS TABLE SHOWS HOW THE PROBABILITY P THAT AT LEAST ONE OF
THE TEAM MEMBERS IS A COMPETITOR IMPACTS ON THE TEAM’S
PERFORMANCE. VALUES SHOW THE MEAN FOR THE AVERAGE UTILITY OF
TEAM MEMBERS
FUM50 and FUM75 perform better than FUM and are not
so affected by the infiltrated agent (16%-33% performance
reduction for FUM75 in the highest risk scenario, and 9%-
10% performance reduction for FUM50). Thus, it is acknowl-
edged that without any additional mechanism (e.g., trust and
reputation models [8]) the proposed negotiation model is not
convenient for scenarios where it is very likely that competitor
agents may enter a team. In cases where there is a high risk of
encountering manipulators, models based on majority/plurality
voting paradigms such as SSV [4] or modifications of FUM
like FUM50 and FUM75 may prove to be more fit since a
large number of competitor agents may be needed to sabotage
the negotiation. However, the unanimity would not be assured
anymore, which we consider highly desirable for teams.
D. Strategy Deviation
The proposed model assumes that team members state the
truth when asked about which attribute values they need to
reach their desired utility level during the offer construction
phase. When dealing with selfish agents, one risk faced is
the fact that selfish agents may not tell the truth in order to
maximize their own utility. In this case, it seems clear that
team members have no incentives to ask for less attribute
value than they need since it may end up in an agreement
with a utility inferior to the desired level of utility. However,
team members may have incentives to demand more value
if that maximizes their utilities (be more demanding). For
a team member to play strategically, it would need to have
some knowledge about team members’ and opponent’s utility
functions, deadlines, reservation utilities, and other agents’
strategies. We aim to propose negotiation models for open
environments, where information is private. Therefore, agents
usually have limited and uncertain information regarding the
negotiation conditions. This leads to the question of whether or
not team members would achieve higher utilities by deviating
from the proposed strategy.
In this subsection we analyze whether or not team members
have incentives to deviate from the proposed strategy in the
offer construction phase. For this matter, we designed two
types of deviated team members. The first type of deviated
agent, which we will name slightly deviated, behaves exactly
as the standard behavior proposed for team members in this
article. However, during the iterated offer construction phase,
the agent does not ask for the value it needs from attribute j,
but a value that reports higher utility than it needs. The amount
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of extra utility that it attempts to achieve is controlled by a
parameter di. When di > 1, the team member demands more
value than it needs, as it can be appreciated in the formula:
xai,j = argmin
x∈[0,1]
(di× (sai(t)−Uai(X
′t
A→op))−wai,jVai,j(x))
(11)
When the utility of the partial offer exceeds or equals the
desired utility level sai(t), the agent abandons the offer
construction phase at that round. The effect of this behavior
is that, when the agent is asked to set an attribute which
can report the desired utility, it demands more value for that
attribute and then leaves the iterated building process. For
instance, if a seller agent needs 0.50 for the price attribute
in order to reach its desired utility level and di = 1.25, it
will ask for 0.50 × 1.25 = 0.625 instead. The second type
of deviated team member, named highly deviated, behaves as
the slightly deviated team member but when it has reached
its desired utility level, it stays an additional attribute in the
iterated building process. When asked about the value of that
extra attribute, the highly deviated agent asks for a random
value that reports between 10% and 50% of the attribute’s
utility. For instance, assuming that the price is scaled between
0 and 1, a highly deviated seller that has reached its desired
utility level would ask for a price value between 0.1 and 0.5.
After setting the extra negotiation attribute, the highly deviated
team member leaves the offer construction phase.
We set the parameters of our model to the same values
used in the previous experiment: TA = Top = U [30, 60]
for long deadline scenarios, TA = Top = U [5, 10] for
short deadline scenarios, RUai = RUop = U [0, 0.25],and
βA = βop = U [0.4, 0.99]. A total of 100 randomly generated
teams with size M = 4 and random utility functions (4
attributes) were confronted with 12 randomly generated oppo-
nents. Each possible negotiation was repeated 4 times. Thus,
a total of 4800 negotiations were carried out per model and
environment. We studied the effect of the number of slightly
deviated agents |A|sd = {1, 2, 3, 4} (the rest of team members
having the standard behavior), the effect of the number of
highly deviated agents |A|hd = {1, 2, 3, 4} (the rest of team
members having the standard behavior), and different values
for di = {1.25, 1.50, 1.75} (all of the deviated agents were
set to have the same di). The quality measure studied was
the average utility since an increment in the utility of one of
the team members will always have a positive effect on the
average utility (same type of valuation functions). The results
of the experiment are depicted in Table IV. We only show the
results for the long deadline scenario, but it should be noted
that the same pattern was found for short deadline scenarios. It
can be observed that all the combinations obtain similar results
in terms of average utility. There is only a slight decrement in
the average utility as we move to more demanding attitudes
(e.g., |A|hd = 4, di = 1.75). Even though, the differences
between the most demanding behaviors and other behaviors
are not large enough to be considered significant. Thus, the
experimental results suggest that team members may not have
incentives to deviate much from the proposed strategy. A
closer look at the negotiation traces explained the previous
results. While being more demanding may obtain higher
di = 1 di = 1.25 di = 1.5 di = 1.75
|A| = 4 [0.71-0.72] - - -
|A|sd = 1 - [0.70-0.72] [0.71-0.72] [0.70-0.71]
|A|sd = 2 - [0.71-0.72] [0.71-0.72] [0.70-0.72]
|A|sd = 3 - [0.71-0.72] [0.70-0.72] [0.69-0.70]
|A|sd = 4 - [0.70-0.72] [0.70-0.72] [0.69-0.71]
|A|hd = 1 - [0.70-0.72] [0.71-0.72] [0.70-0.71]
|A|hd = 2 - [0.70-0.71] [0.70-0.72] [0.69-0.71]
|A|hd = 3 - [0.69-0.71] [0.69-0.71] [0.69-0.70]
|A|hd = 4 - [0.69-0.70] [0.69-0.70] [0.68-0.69]
di = 1 di = 1.25 di = 1.5 di = 1.75
|A| = 4 206 - - -
|A|sd = 1 - 208 205 199
|A|sd = 2 - 202 230 236
|A|sd = 3 - 199 240 243
|A|sd = 4 - 248 267 287
|A|hd = 1 - 202 189 236
|A|hd = 2 - 241 246 274
|A|hd = 3 - 256 301 302
|A|hd = 4 - 299 292 324
TABLE IV
THE UPPER TABLE SHOWS CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR THE AVERAGE
UTILITY DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF deviated AGENTS AND di . THE
LOWER TABLE SHOWS THE NUMBER OF FAILED NEGOTIATIONS FOR EACH
CASE. SOME OF THE COMBINATIONS ARE EMPTY SINCE THEY DO NOT
MAKE SENSE IN PRACTICE (E.G., 0 deviated AGENTS AND di > 1).
utilities in successful negotiations, it may also lead to a higher
number of failed negotiations, thus leading to lower or equal
average utilities. These results can be observed also at Table
IV, where there is a clear tendency for the number of failed
negotiations to increase as team members deviate further from
the standard behavior.
V. RELATED WORK
In the last few years, there has been growing interest in
multiagent systems as a support for complex and distributed
systems. Among these complex systems, there is special
interest in scenarios where multiple agents, with possibly
conflicting goals, cooperate with each other to reach their
own goals. The benefits of cooperation and coordination are
well known, and, as stated by Klein [9], computer systems
may help us to identify and apply the appropriate coordina-
tion mechanism. Due to the inherent conflict among agents,
techniques that allow agents to solve their own conflicts and
cooperate are needed. This need is what has given birth to a
group of technologies which have recently been referred to as
agreement technologies [10]. Trust and reputation [8], norms
[11], agent organizations [12], [13], argumentation [14], [15]
and automated negotiation [16], [17] are part of the core that
makes up this new family of technologies.
Despite being part of agreement technologies, automated
negotiation has been studied by scholars for a few years.
Automated negotiation consists of an automated search pro-
cess for an agreement between two or more parties where
participants exchange proposals. Two different research trends
can be distinguished in automated negotiation models. The first
type of model aims to calculate the optimum strategy given
certain information about the opponent and the negotiation
environment [18], [19]. The second type of model encloses
heuristics that do not calculate the optimum strategy but obtain
results that aim to be as close to the optimum as possible [6],
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Work Teams Mediated Parties
Faratin et al. [6], [21] No No 2
Jonker et al. [20] No No 2
Lai et al. [7] No No 2
Sanchez-Anguix et al. [17] No No 2
Ehtamo et al. [22] No Yes n
Klein et al. [23] No Yes n
Ito et al. [24] No Yes n
Sanchez-Anguix et al. (2011) [4] Yes Yes 2
TABLE V
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STATE-OF-THE-ART NEGOTIATION MODELS AND
THEIR FEATURES
[20], [21], [7]. These models assume imperfect knowledge
about the opponent and the environment, and aim to be
computationally tractable while obtaining good results. This
present work can be classified into the latter type of models.
Most of the research has concentrated on bilateral models
where each party is a single individual. Our article studies
bilateral negotiations where at least one of the parties is a
negotiation team, made up of more than a single individual.
It should be noted that the problem of finding an agreement
for a negotiation team is inherently complex since it not only
requires finding an agreement with the other party but it also
entails reaching some type of consensus within the team.
Even though communications with the opponent party may
be similar to classic bilateral models, negotiation teams may
require an additional level of negotiation that involves team
members. Thus, classical bilateral models cannot be applied
directly if a certain level of consensus is necessary regarding
team decisions. As far as we know, our previous work is [4]
is the only work that focuses on negotiation teams. Despite
that, bilateral negotiation is perhaps the most similar topic to
our current research. Hence, we describe some of the most
important negotiation models that use imperfect knowledge.
A brief overview of these models can be observed in Table V.
Faratin et al. [6] propose a non-mediated bilateral ne-
gotiation model for service negotiation where agents apply
and mix different concession tactics (i.e., time-dependent,
imitative and resource-dependent). In their work, they analyze
the impact of the model’s parameters and determine which
configurations work better in different scenarios by means
of experiments. Our proposed work also assumes the use of
time-dependent concession strategies for the calculation of
agents’ aspirations at each negotiation round. Additionally, we
also take an experimental approach to validate the impact of
our model’s parameters. Later, the authors proposed a non-
mediated bilateral negotiation model [21] whose main novelty
was the use of trade-offs to improve agreements between two
parties. A trade-off consists of reducing the utility obtained
from some negotiation issues with the goal of obtaining the
same exact utility from other negotiation issues. The rationale
behind trade-offs is to make the offer more likable for the
opponent while maintaining the same level of satisfaction for
the proposing agent. For that purpose, the authors propose a
fuzzy similarity heuristic that proposes the most similar offer
to the last offer received from the opponent. Our model does
not leave room for trade-offs since the offer that is calculated
at each negotiation round is deterministic with respect to the
agenda of issues and the current aspiration level of team
members. However, its main strength lies in the fact that it
is capable of guaranteeing the desired level of utility for each
team member at each round.
Jonker and Treur propose the Agent-Based Market Place
(ABMP) non-mediated model [20] where agents, engage in
bilateral negotiations. ABMP is a negotiation model where
proposed bids are concessions to previous bids. The amount
of concession is regulated by the concession factor (i.e.,
reservation utility), the negotiation speed, the acceptable utility
gap (maximal difference between the target utility and the
utility of an offer that is acceptable), and the impatience
factor (which governs the probability of the agent leaving the
negotiation process).
Lai et al. [7] propose a non-mediated bilateral negotiation
model where agents are allowed to propose up to k different
offers at each negotiation round. Offers are proposed from the
current iso-utility curve according to a similarity mechanism
that selects the most similar offer to the last offer received from
the opponent. The selected similarity heuristic is the Euclidean
distance since it is general and does not require domain-
specific knowledge and information regarding the opponent’s
utility function. Results showed that the strategy is capable of
reaching agreements that are very close to the Pareto Frontier.
Sanchez-Anguix et al. [17] proposed an enhancement for this
non-mediated strategy in environments where computational
resources are very limited and utility functions are complex.
It relies on genetic algorithms to sample offers that are
interesting for the agent itself and creates new offers during the
negotiation process that are interesting for both parties. Results
showed that the model is capable of obtaining statistically
equivalent results to similar models that had the full iso-utility
curve sampled, while being computationally more tractable.
Another topic that resembles team negotiations are multi-
party negotiations. Several works have been proposed in
the literature along this line [22], [23], [24]. For instance,
Ehtamo et al. [22] propose a mediated multi-party negotiation
protocol which looks for joint gains in an iterated way. The
algorithm starts from a tentative agreement and moves in
a direction according to what the agents prefer regarding
some offers’ comparison. Results showed that the algorithm
converges quickly to Pareto optimal points. Klein et al. [23]
propose a mediated negotiation model which can be extended
to multiple parties. Their main goal is to provide solutions
for negotiation processes that use complex utility functions
to model agents’ preferences. The negotiation attributes are
no longer independent, and, thus, preference spaces cannot
be explored as easily as in the linear case. Later, Ito et
al. [24] proposed different types of utility functions (cube
and cone constraints) and multiparty mediated negotiation
models that obtain good quality results for the proposed utility
functions. The main difference between our work and multi-
party negotiations lies in the nature of the conflict and how
protocols are devised. Even though each team member could
be viewed as a participant in a multi-party negotiation with the
opponent, it is natural to think that team members’ preferences
are more similar (e.g., a team of buyers, a group of friends,
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etc.) and they trust other teammates more than the opponent
(i.e., they may share more information). Furthermore, multi-
party negotiation models may be unfair for agents that are
alien to the team if the number of team members exceeds the
number of other participants. In that case, multi-party models
may be inclined to move the negotiation towards agreements
that maximize the preferences of team members.
Multi-agent teamwork is also a close research topic. Agent
teams have been proposed for a variety of tasks such as
Robocup [25], rescue tasks [26], and transportation tasks [27].
However, as far as we know, there is no published work that
considers teams of agents negotiating with an opponent. Most
works in agent teamwork consider fully cooperative agents that
work to maximize shared goals. The team negotiation setting
is different since, even though team members share a common
interest related to the negotiation, there may be competition
among team members to maximize one’s own preferences.
Finally, given the results obtained by our proposed model,
consensus building should be mentioned as a close research
topic outside agent research. Our proposed model is capable of
attaining consensus/unanimity regarding team decisions under
the assumption of private information. Consensus building
works like [28], [29] usually take the assumption that all
the information regarding parties is available to a trusted
mediator. Cook et al. [28], generalize the use of distance-based
measures to obtain consensus over multiple decision makers
with ordinal preferences by assigning utility weights to ordinal
positions. They show that this representation is equivalent to
the commonly used model of using ordinal positions as utility
weights for options. Herrera-Viedma et al. [29] propose a
computational model that is able to help humans/experts to
reach soft consensus over a set of alternatives. The model is
based on an iterative process where two measures are used to
achieve this result: a soft consensus measure, and a proximity
measure. Both measures are used to evaluate how close the
individual expert opinion with respect to the collective opinion
is, and help the computational system to provide feedback to
experts that are far from the group’s opinion. Even though the
goal is similar to our work, the assumptions are different. We
advocate for open systems like e-commerce systems, where
agents act semi-automatically on behalf of their users. Since
any type of agent can be found in open environments, privacy
is a big concern due to distrust and risk of exploitation. Thus,
it is not possible for a mediator to know the preferences and
all of the information about the participants in the negotiation.
In our approach, we only consider that a limited amount of
information is transmitted to the mediator.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we have proposed an agent-based negotiation
model for negotiation teams that interact with an opponent
using the bilateral alternating protocol in electronic systems.
A negotiation team is a group of two or more agents that
join together as a single negotiation party because they share
a common goal which is related to the negotiation process.
Thus, as a team, they have to decide which offers are sent
to the opponent and whether or not the offers received from
the opponent are acceptable. The main strength of our pro-
posed model lies in the fact that decisions within the team
are unanimous (i.e., the utility reported by the decision is
greater than or equal to the desired utility level by each team
member). The negotiation model relies on a trusted mediator
that coordinates voting processes, regulates an iterated process
for offer construction, and guarantees unanimity.
After describing our proposal, we have shown how the
model is capable of ensuring unanimity regarding team de-
cisions. Then, we theoretically analyzed the robustness of
our model against different types of attacks. The proposed
model is robust against manipulations from the opponent, but
it is sensitive to manipulations coming from agents from the
competition that try to sabotage a possible agreement with the
opponent. We also presented different experiments analyzing
the impact of different parameters of the model such as the
negotiation agenda followed by the mediator to decide which
attributes are set first, and the impact of the number of attribute
decision rights that are handed over by team members prior
to the negotiation. Additionally, we carried out an empirical
evaluation of the robustness of the proposed model against
attacks from agents that represent the competition, which
reflects our initial concerns in the theoretical analysis. Finally,
we studied whether or not team members have incentives to
deviate from the proposed strategy. Empirical results suggest
that there is not much incentive to deviate from the proposed
strategy since deviations may impact the number of failed
negotiations and, thus, the average utility.
Future work includes the evaluation of the present negoti-
ation model and other models proposed in the literature [4]
in different negotiation scenarios. The rationale behind this
analysis is to determine which strategies are more appropriate
for team members according to different criteria such as
utilitarian measures (minimum, average, maximum) and com-
putational measures (number of messages exchanged, number
of negotiation rounds). Our goal is using this knowledge in
a decision-making mechanism that allows teams to select the
most appropriate negotiation model according to their needs.
We acknowledge that the current model is capable of reach-
ing unanimity given the assumption of monotonic valuation
functions and linear utility functions. Therefore, future work
also includes exploring aggregation mechanisms that reach
consensus/soft consensus for non-monotonic attributes like
colors, brands, etc. In this sense, fuzzy consensus/similarity
measures as the ones proposed in [21], [29] can help to
aggregate agents’ opinions over this type of attributes.
Moreover, in the last few years there has been a growing in-
terest in modeling negotiation as a dynamic process [30], [31].
Despite being an interesting approach, its study is still at early
stages and focused on simple negotiations, while our current
model involves a negotiation team, and a negotiation party,
which increments the complexity of the modeling problem. In
this sense, the use of new search and optimization algorithms
like gravitational search algorithms [32], pomdp [31], and
machine learning approaches with efficient data selection [33]
can help to further improve the state of the art in negotiation.
Nevertheless, dynamic modeling of agent negotiation teams is
a topic that should be studied in the future.
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